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RECENT DECISIONS

RECENT DECISIONS
This section is divided into two parts: notes and abstracts. The abstracts consist merely
of summaries of the facts and holdings of recent cases and are distinguished from the notes
by the absence ,of discussion.

NOTES
CONTRACTS-ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF A UNILATERAL OBLIGATION
TO PAY MoNEY-Plaintiff, a real estate broker, was employed by defendant
under a contract to negotiate the purchase of tracts of land. By the terms of
the contract, plaintiff's commission was not to be paid until defendant accepted
title to the land purchased. A sale of land for defendant was consummated
by plaintiff but defendant, before accepting title, denied the existence of any
contractual obligation to plaintiff for his services. Plaintiff brought suit for
his commission. Held, there can be no recovery on a unilateral obligation to
pay money before time for payment has arrived. The anticipatory breach doctrine is applicable only in cases where, at the time of repudiation, the contract
has mutually dependent, executory covenants. Brown Paper Mill Co. 'IJ. Irvin,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 232.
In Hochster 'IJ. De la Tour the English court in confusing a distinction
between giving the plaintiff an excuse for the non-performance of his obligations and an immediate right of action was led to adopt the doctrine of anticipatory breach. Although American courts later recognized that defendant's repudiation gave plaintiff this excuse for non-performance, they still permitted
him, at his election, to maintain immediate action upon the contract.2 While
courts generally have accepted the doctrine in cases of executory, bi-lateral
contracts having dependent promises,3 they have not done so in cases where the
only contractual obligation is defendant's promise to pay money at a future
1

2 El. & Bl. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853). The court, in substance, implies
that it reached its conclusion for the reason that it saw no other way to protect plaintiff. But see Ripley v. McClure, 4 Exch. 345, 154 Eng. Rep. 1245 (1849) decided
before Hochster v. De la Tour, where the court recognized that a repudiation by
defendant can be a defense to plaintiff.
See generally 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§§ 1313, 1315 (1937).
2
Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 20 S.Ct. 780 (1900). Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum
Corp. v. Krow, (C.C.A. 10th, 1930) 40 F. (2d) 488.
3
But see Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874) where the court' says,
"Until the time arrives when, by the terms of the agreement, he is or might be entitled to its performance, he can suffer no injury or deprivation which can form a
ground of damages." For an attack on this doctrine see Williston, "Repudiation of
Contracts," 14 HARV. L. REV. 317 and 421 (1901).
But see Vold, "The Tort Aspects of Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts," 41
HARV. L. REv. 340 (1928) for a vigorous and many-sided defense of the doctrine
and for a detailed consideration of the varied criticism of the doctrine. And note
page 354, where the author, arguing by analogy, suggests that an action for anticipatory
breach can be supported on the same ground as a tort action for impairment of a contract right and cites Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. and Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853)
for tort principle. See also Ballantine, '"Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of
Contractual Duties," 22 MICH. L. REV. 329 (1924).
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time. 4 The reason for this distinction is difficult to see. G In fact, it has been
pointed out that it is in this type of case that the plaintiff really needs the prompt
aid of the courts.6 But, despite persistent criticism, the attitude of the courts,
with little exception, has ,remained steadfast. There has been some opinion to
the contrary. 7 However, aside from the question of the necessity of the doctyine
in any 'case and the justifiability of the distinction that the courts have set up,
needless confusion can be avoided if the courts will abstain from talking anticipatory breach in cases which should be decided on other grounds; If there has
been a present breach by defendant followed by his repudiation 8 of his remaining
obligation, it seems that the court is faced with a problem of the measure of
recovery of damages and not with a matter of anticipatory breach. And there
is sufficient authority to justify the recovery of future damages in this type of
situatjon.9 In fact, the plaintiff may be said to have but one cause of action and
4
CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 318 (1932) adopts the view that no action can
be brought for the repudiation of a unilateral future obligation making no distinction
between unilateral obligation to pay money and other obligations, but see 105 A.L.R.
460 (1936) where the author analyzes a group of cases and concludes that courts
apparently deny recovery on this doctrine as a rule only in cases of money contracts.
G Limiting the doctrine to executory contracts may be nothing more than an expression of the consistent desire of the courts, generally, to confine a doct~ine to the
type of situation responsible for its birth.
6
Grismore, 31 MICH, L. REv. 526 (1933); also see 37 MICH. L. REv. u38
(1939)
7
Pollack v. Pollack, (Tex. App. 1932) 46 S.W. (2d) 292 at 293, where a
court says, "The doctrine which excepts contracts fully performed by one side from
the general rule [i.e. the rule of anticipatory breach] is purely arbitrary, and without
foundation in any logical reason." This was not necessary for the decision, for the court
found that defendant's obligation pure and simple. This dictum again cited in Universal Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Sanders, 129 Texas 344, 102 S.W. (2d)
405 (1937) as law in Texas.
·
See also Moore v. Security Trust and_ Life Insurance Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 1909)
168 F. 496 at 505, dissenting opinion, "I perceive no reason for believing that the
plaintiffs, by reason of having performed their part of the contract, are in a less
favorable position than if the contract was still executory as to them." See also Equitable Trust Co. v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1917) 244 F. 485 at 501 and

502.

8

See 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1466 (1937) as to what action on
the part of the defendant is sufficient or necessary to constitute repudiation.
9
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1317 (1937). McCoRMICK, DAMAGES,
§ 144 (1935). In Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315 at 320, 180 A. 464
(1935) the court said, "When •.• a partial breach [of a contract] is accompanied
or followed by a repudiation of the entire contract, the promisee may treat it as a total
breach?' In Pollack v. Pollack, (Tex. App. 1932) 46 S.W. (2d) 292 at 292, after
deciding that there was a present breach plus repudiation, the court continues, plaintiff
"is entitled in one suit to receive in damages the present value of all that he would
have received if the contract had been performed, and he is not compelled to resort
to repeated suits to recover the monthly payments." See also Viglas v. New York Life
Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 1st, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 829. And see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Phifer,
160 Ark. 98, 254 S.W. 335 (1923). -Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pool, 189
Ark. IOI, 71 S.W. (2d) 455 (1934) which have been cited erroneously at times to
support contention tha courts permitted recovery for a unilateral obligation to pay

7
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run afoul of the rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action if he attempts
to bring successive suits as performance by defendant matures.10 Such an approach would also obviate the necessity of interpreting what apparently are
unilateral into executory contracts, in order to give the plaintiff a cause of
action.11 And when the facts show that the defendant is merely controverting
the interpretation of the contract or denying in "good faith" the existence of
the contract, it seems manifestly oppressive and unjust to talk of anticipatory
breach.12 It is submitted that the principal case is correctly decided but that the
court should have rested the decision on the fact that there was no repudiation
of the contract,1 8 rather than on the doctrine of anticipatory breach.
George Brody

money but the court in the principal case correctly points out that these cases dealt
with the present breach plus repudiation. The court in the principal case implies that
it would permit recovery of future damages in such a case.
10 Pakas v. Hollingshead, 184 N.Y. 211, 77 N.E. 40 (1916). Contra, Barron
G. Collier, Inc. v. Rawson, 202 Iowa 1159, 2II N.W. 704 (19~7).
11 Federal,Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, (C.C.A. 6th, 1926) 12 F. (2d) 693 where
the court declares that there is not an unconditional promise to pay money where
plaintiff has to submit her person to a physical examination every 30 days and send
a report of the examination to the company. This approach was vigorously criticized
in Kitchart v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (D.C.Mo. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 719. See also
Cobb v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, 4 Cal. (2d) 565 at 573, 51 P.
(2d) 84 (1935) where the court said, "The fact that he was required or requested
to submit to reasonable future medical examinations or furnish an occasional health
report is too trivial and inconsequential to be regarded as an unperformed obligation on
the part of the insured."
12 In Kimmel v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 10th, 1934) 71 F. (2d)
921, it was said, "An offer to perform in accordance with the promiser's interpretation
of the contract although erroneous, if made in good faith, is not such a clear and
unequivocal refusal to perform as amounts to a renunciation giving rise to an anticipatory
breach .••• 'If this were not the law, it would be a dangerous thing to stand upon a
controverted construction of a contract..•• It would amount to a virtual denial of the
right to insist upon an honest, but erroneous, interpretation.' " Cobb v. Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of California, 4 Cal. (2d) 565, 51 P. (2d) 84 (1935).
18 The court in the principal case clearly states, at p. 23 2, "There is no evidence
of default in, or refusal of, performance of the purchase contract by either party to
it.••• the most that can be said for appellee, at time of trial, is that appellant had
denied the existence of the contract•..."

